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8 INCE its ratification in 1868, the equal protection guarantee' has
been notable for its underachievement. The fourteenth amendment
was adopted shortly after the Civil War to secure the citizenship and
basic rights of those individuals whose humanity the Constitution's origi-
nal framers bartered away.2 The amendment also empowered Congress
to enforce its provisions through appropriate legislation.'
In its first test after ratification,4 however, the fourteenth amendment's
potential for challenging official discrimination was significantly cur-
tailed. The Supreme Court effectively trimmed the privileges and immu-
nities clause to the point that it has never operated as a meaningful check
upon exercises of state power.' Although initially determining that the
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Berkeley; M.S., Northwestern University; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles.
The general themes and concepts related in this article are amplified and explored in
further context and detail in a forthcoming book: D. Lively, The Constitution and Race
(1992).
1. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. As the price for Southern support for the Constitution, the framers accommo-
dated the institution of slavery. See W. Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitution-
alism in America, 1760-1848 62-65 (1977). The Supreme Court subsequently noted that
because they were "so far inferior [and] had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect ... negro[es] might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery." Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857). The Court found that "the right of property in a slave is dis-
tinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution." Id. at 451. Constitutional provisions
overtly accommodating slavery include congressional representation and federal taxation
provisions equating a slave's status to three-fifths of a person. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2,
cl. 3; id. § 9, cl. 4. For a discussion of how several other provisions served the institution
of slavery, see W. Wiecek, supra, at 62-63.
3. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
4. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). This group of cases concerned a
challenge to a state law prohibiting, with one exception, livestock yards and slaughter-
houses within a city and surrounding areas. See id. at 59-60.
5. The Court determined that the privileges and immunities clause afforded no new
protection for a citizen of a state against the legislative power of the state. See id. at 77-
79. As the dissent noted, the majority's construction of the clause reduced it to a redun-
dant nullity. See id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting). The architect of the fourteenth amend-
ment, Representative John A. Bingham, intended that "privileges and immunities"
incorporate the first eight amendments to the Constitution. J. James, The Framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment 106 (1956).
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due process clause had no substantive significance,6 by the turn of the
century, the Court transformed it into a source of Social Darwinist val-
ues that supported rather than challenged racist notions.7 By a process
of elimination, therefore, the equal protection clause became the primary
constitutional vehicle for combatting racial injustice.
The fourteenth amendment restructured basic law by recognizing and
accounting for a class of citizens that had been slighted in the original
drafting process and demeaned by subsequent jurisprudence.' Prior to
United States v. Carolene Products Company,9 however, Justice Holmes
described the equal protection guarantee as "the last resort of constitu-
tional arguments." 10 Several generations would elapse following the rati-
fication of the fourteenth amendment before the Court forcefully
employed the equal protection clause to account for minority interests.1 I
In eventually disclaiming the fourteenth amendment as a basis of eco-
nomic liberty,12 the Court suggested the possibility of enhanced judicial
attention to "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities."' 3
Invariably, construction of an abstract principle will reflect the subjec-
tive views and experience of its interpreter. The phenomenon is particu-
larly evident with respect to an amorphous constitutional term like
"equal protection" that is neither self-defining nor self-executing. 14 Ab-
6. The Court construed the provision to require that laws be enacted pursuant to
procedural due process. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 80-81.
7. The Lochner Court interpreted the fourteenth amendment due process clause to
afford substantive protections of economic and other liberties. See Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (describing Lochner doctrine); Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev.
873, 877-79 (1987) (same). Justice Holmes criticized the Lochner majority for constitu-
tionally enshrining "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
8. The fourteenth amendment was ratified in 1868. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
proposal and ratification (U.S.C. 1988).
9. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
10. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). Holmes' refusal to take the equal protec-
tion guarantee seriously was congruent with a sense that it would be "pointless" for
courts to provide relief to minorities, given the white majority's lack of sympathy toward
minority interests. See, eg., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903) (holding that fed-
eral courts did not have jurisdiction over black citizens' fifteenth amendment claim of
race-based denial of right to vote).
11. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
12. See, eg., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941) (fourteenth amend-
ment does not preclude state minimum wage regulations); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Par-
rish, 300 U.S. 379, 397 (1937) (substantive due process doctrine "a departure from the
true application of the principles governing the regulation by the state of the relation of
employer and employed").
13. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
14. The fourteenth amendment is not the only ambiguous constitutional provision.
While some provisions, such as those setting age qualifications for elected offices, see U.S.
Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5, are relatively precise, the provisions concern-
ing individual rights and liberties are universally abstract. See id. amends I-X. There-




sent an explicit command to actuate the equal protection guarantee in
comprehensive and substantive fashion, it is not surprising that the provi-
sion has demonstrated limited utility in vindicating minority interests.
Born of limited aims and aspirations and crafted by a culturally homoge-
neous group, much like the Constitution's original provisions, the four-
teenth amendment reflected the influence of white superiority."5 The
result was a fundamental but qualified demand for racial equality limited
to contract and property rights, individual security and legal status.' 6
The limited agenda and vision of the fourteenth amendment's archi-
tects neither precluded nor restrained dramatic judicial expansion of the
provision's scope beyond considerations of race. 7 The Court has recog-
nized various unenumerated fundamental rights that reflect and vindi-
cate the values and priorities of the dominant culture.' An examination
of the Court's racial jurisprudence reinforces the impression that the
fourteenth amendment's meaning for minorities is primarily a function of
evolving majority tolerance.
During the late nineteenth century, when official racial segregation
was challenged,' 9 the Court repudiated the notion of a color-blind consti-
tution and created the separate but equal doctrine.20 A century later,
when affirmative action was contested as a means of remedying racial
disparities, color-blindness was subscribed to in undifferentiating fash-
ion.2' In the interim, an anti-discrimination principle emerged, only to
be swiftly eviscerated by tests that frustrated proof of constitutional vio-
lations." The Court has also thwarted alternative strategies for exposing
15. Official segregation existed in both the North and South. See RL Berger, Govern-
ment By Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment 14 (1977).
Moreover, at least two northern states-Indiana and Oregon--excluded blacks alto-
gether. See id. The fourteenth amendment's framers did not intend to outlaw or con-
demn racial segregation. Rather, they limited their purposes to securing for blacks "the
right to acquire property, the right to go and come at pleasure, the right to enforce rights
in the courts, to make contracts, and inherit and dispose of property." Cong. Globe, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866) (statement of Rep. Trumbull); Perry, Modern Equal Protec-
tion: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1026-28 (1979).
16. See infra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
18. In identifying unenumerated fundamental rights, the Court plumbs society's val-
ues to determine whether an interest is rooted in its "traditions and conscience." See.
e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) ("right to engage in homosexual
sodomy" not so rooted); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (liberty to elect abortion
so rooted). The Court's inquiry is designed to discern pervasive if not virtually consen-
sual popular support for a premise. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 (inquiry reflects judici-
ary's sense that it "is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution").
19. See A. Lewis, Portrait of a Decade 18 (1964).
20. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896).
21. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989) (plu-
rality opinion) (standard of classification not affected by race of those harmed or helped
by classification); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("strict scrutiny must be applied to all
governmental classification by race").
22. In order to establish a fourteenth amendment violation, plaintiffs must demon-
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and defeating persisting racial discrimination.23 Modern case law, unlike
its juridical antecedents, may condemn the nation's history of discrimina-
tion24 and speak in forceful rhetoric.25 In reality, however, the history of
fourteenth amendment review reveals a pattern of judicial subservience
to dominant social interests.
An examination of the full record of fourteenth amendment jurispru-
dence reveals few instances of the equal protection guarantee successfully
vindicating minority interests. Racial duality in housing,26 criminal jus-
tice 27 and employment2" persistently have survived constitutional chal-
lenge. The judicial mandate to desegregate public education29 indicated
a radical restructuring of fourteenth amendment jurisprudence. 31 Subse-
quent glosses upon the desegregation formula, however, limited its actual
impact as a force for societal change. 3' The fourteenth amendment has
strate that a discriminatory purpose motivated the challenged state action. See Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976). Because proof of wrongful intent is elusive,
the discriminatory purpose requirement effectively precludes relief from many forms of
government discrimination. See, e.g., Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 544-45
(1982) (no discriminatory intent found in amendment to state constitution that limited
court-ordered busing); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280-81 (1979);
(no discriminatory intent found in statute granting preferential hiring to veterans); Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977)
(no discriminatory intent found in zoning plan).
23. In City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981), a traffic barrier erected be-
tween black and white neighborhoods was challenged unsuccessfully under the thir-
teenth amendment as a "badge of slavery." See id. at 124, 128-29.
24. See, eg., J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 499 ("there is no doubt [that this nation has
a] sorry history of both private and public discrimination"); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 278 n.5 (1986) ("[n]o one disputes that there has been race discrimi-
nation in this country").
25. Thus, while the Court construed 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) to provide no relief for
on-the-job racial harassment, it observed that "[n]either our words nor our decisions
should be interpreted as signaling one inch of retreat from... forbid[ding] discrimination
in the private, as well as the public, sphere." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 188 (1989).
26. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977) (rejecting equal protection challenge to zoning restrictions which
precluded low income housing and adversely affected minorities).
27. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 289-91, 298 n.20 (1987) (rejecting
equal protection challenge to death penalty premised upon both statistical demonstration
that penalty was disproportionately imposed upon blacks and argument that disparate
impact was legacy of prior racially dual criminal justice system).
28. See, eg., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976) (rejecting equal pro-
tection challenge to employment testing procedures that blacks failed at higher rates than
whites).
29. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
30. The Court heard arguments in the Brown case during the term before the desegre-
gation decree was announced. See id. at 488. It then delayed issuance of its remedial
decree for another term, see Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955), in order
to obtain cooperation from and defuse resistance by state and local officials.
31. As Justice Marshall observed, limiting the purview of the equal protection clause
to instances of dejure segregation ensures that "[n]egro children.., will receive the same
separate and inherently unequal education in the future as they have been unconstitution-




proven more useful in addressing interests unrelated to race than in effec-
tuating its central purpose.32 Even as a predicate for legislative action,33
judicial interpretations that allowed Congress to reach only state action
circumscribed the scope of the amendment. 34
The concept of equal protection has probably raised and dashed more
expectations of social progress than any other constitutional provision.
For instance, the Court's school desegregation jurisprudence not only
promised unitary school systems 35 but also equal educational opportu-
nity.36 Such aspirations have not been realized, however, and have actu-
ally been undercut by limiting constructions of the amendment that have
left educational equality interests substantially unimproved or worse
off.37 Recent decisions, despite their rhetoric, exhibit a reluctance to con-
32. Following the Court's much criticized employment of the fourteenth amendment
to protect economic liberty earlier this century, the amendment became the foundation
for a right to privacy in matters concerning abortion, family, marriage and contraception.
See, eg., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (fundamental right to marry
under fourteenth amendment); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04
(1977) (plurality opinion) (fundamental right to family association); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (fundamental liberty to elect abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (fundamental right to privacy protects married couples' access
to contraceptives). The right to privacy, however, was not construed to encompass a
right to government funding of abortions for poor women. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (denial of public funding for medically necessary abortions does
not violate fourteenth amendment); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1977) (denial of
public funding for nontherapeutic abortions does not violate fourteenth amendment).
This cabining of the privacy right was particularly injurious to non-white mothers. See
Harris, 448 U.S. at 343 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. See U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 5.
34. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (Congress' power under
section five of fourteenth amendment may not extend beyond coverage of section one);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875) (fourteenth amendment does not
impose affirmative power upon federal government to compel states to treat all citizens
equally). The limitation may have been insignificant well into the twentieth century,
however, because Congress largely countenanced segregation, as evidenced by the segre-
gation of schools in the District of Columbia. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498
(1954). The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (1988), which prohibited
discrimination in public accommodations, see id. at § 2000a(a)-(c), was enacted nearly a
decade after the Court held that racial segregation was unconstitutional. In response to
judicial limitations upon the power of the fourteenth amendment, the 1964 Act was en-
acted pursuant to the commerce clause. See id. at § 2000a(b)-(c). The Court has held
that Congress may reach private activity under the commerce clause if there is a rational
basis for concluding that the private activity affects interstate commerce and the means
Congress chooses to regulate the activity are reasonable and appropriate. See Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964). The Court eventually rec-
ognized congressional power to reach private action under the fourteenth amendment.
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-50 (1966) (Congress has same broad pow-
ers under fourteenth amendment as afforded by necessary and proper clause). By itself,
the commerce power would seem broad enough to support civil rights laws concerning
education, employment, public accommodations and other interests. See, eg., Heart of
Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258-59 (expansive construction of Congress' power to remedy
racial discrimination pursuant to commerce clause power).
35. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
36. See id. at 493.
37. See infra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
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front the persistent reality of racial discrimination 3 and suggest that the
usefulness of the equal protection guarantee as a means of accounting for
minority interests has been substantially undercut.
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company,9 the Court expressed
hostility toward affirmative action by branding remedial classifications as
suspect.4 Thus, color-blindness has emerged as a cardinal fourteenth
amendment principle41 that effectively checks race-conscious remedies.42
Barring two circumstances-rare instances of provably intentional racial
discrimination4 3 and federal initiatives calculated to achieve equal pro-
tection objectives--race-conscious remediation has been constitution-
ally foreclosed.
More than a decade ago, the Court imposed upon equal protection
litigants the burden of proving that challenged state action is prompted
by discriminatory intent.45 Because wrongful motive is elusive and easy
to disguise,46 the discriminatory purpose standard has effectively limited
the equal protection guarantee's reach to instances of overt discrimina-
tion. Thus, the Court has engineered an equal protection standard that,
while useful in 1954 to combat de jure segregation, remains unresponsive
to the subtle, disguised, and even unconscious manifestations of racism
that pervade contemporary society. Affirmative action is the primary vic-
tim of the Court's standards because of its explicit race-consciousness.47
Modem equal protection doctrine perpetuates an historical pattern of
accommodating imperatives of the dominant culture. Nearly a century
ago, the Court rationalized the separate but equal doctrine on the ground
that its critics mistakenly perceived enforced racial separation as imply-
38. See infra notes 158-206 and accompanying text.
39. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
40. See id. at 493-95.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 505-09.
43. See id. at 509.
44. A decade ago, a plurality of the Court deferred to Congress' authority under sec-
tion five of the fourteenth amendment and upheld a minority set-aside provision for fed-
eral public works contracting. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476 (1980)
(plurality opinion). More recently, a majority supported a Federal Communications
Commission policy that afforded preferences to minorities in the broadcast licensing pro-
cess. See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008-09 (1990). The Court up-
held Congress' power to engage in race-conscious remediation pursuant to its power
under section five of the fourteenth amendment, while noting that an important govern-
mental interest in promoting broadcast diversity was at stake. See id. at 3009.
45. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
46. See id.
47. A century ago, in its first review of a constitutional challenge to state segregation,
the Court rejected Justice Harlan's vision of a "Constitution [that] is color-blind." Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Principles of racial neu-
trality manifestly have different implications when affirmative action is the dominant is-
sue. The Court has recalibrated its equal protection standards in a way that serves the
current interests of the dominant culture by adopting a color-blindness principle. See
supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text; infra notes 167-198 and accompanying text.
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ing black inferiority.4" The contemporary Court has disapproved of af-
firmative action partially in reliance on the notion that remedial
programs actually harm minorities.4 9 The rationalizations of past and
present are, therefore, linked by a common disingenuousness that is pre-
sumptuous and paternalistic.
Any attempt to realize the potential goals of the equal protection guar-
antee must respond to the objection that judicial intervention on behalf
of minorities is anti-democratic. It must also reckon with the limitations
originally set for the equal protection agenda and since molded by the
realities of society's moral development. Frustration of the Court's de-
segregation mandate demonstrates that judicial efforts to expand equal
protection jurisprudence beyond the dominant society's capacity for
change are destined to fail.5° The Court's treatment of race-conscious
remedies,5" however, is also susceptible to criticism for imposing a legal
standard of color-blindness that exceeds the progress of morality and is
thus ahead of its time.
As framed and ratified, the fourteenth amendment was the product of
limited aims.-2 Its marginal accounting for minority interests for over
more than a century, however, has elicited arguments for a more expan-
sive and aggressive fourteenth amendment agenda. Resultant and often
competing notions have generally failed to comport with contemporary
realities," prompted allegations of the anti-democratic exercise of judi-
cial power,54 or required profound changes in the structure of society
that are unacceptable to the dominant culture.5 5 Creative fourteenth
amendment theories have largely been unsuccessful as a source of juris-
prudential inspiration and practical result. Such concepts also have di-
verted attention from the potential value of the original understanding of
the equal protection clause as a means of accounting for racial injustice.
When principle fails to synchronize with morality, significant risks of
doctrinal resistance and negation arise. Both the interests of doctrinal
and normative progress would be furthered by an enhanced appreciation
for the relevance of the amendment's original understanding to a society
48. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
49. See infra notes 185-190 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 116-206 and accompanying text.
51. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
52. See infra notes 83-103 and accompanying text.
53. For an explanation of why judicial attention to discrete and insular minorities is
increasingly anachronistic, see infra notes 255-258 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., R. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law
81-82 (1990) (expansive construction of equal protection clause cannot be justified on
grounds it is "good for us" nor pursuant to theory that requires judiciary to perform
legislative function).
55. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Marshall contended that the Milliken Court rejected expansion of the desegregation




that remains functionally, if no longer officially, divided by race
consciousness.
Part I of this Article examines how contemplations of the framers of
the fourteenth amendment and early decisions foreshadowed the equal
protection guarantee's underachievement. Part II demonstrates that
equal protection jurisprudence has consistently accommodated the inter-
ests of the dominant culture. Part III argues that redirection of judicial
attention to the limited but yet unfulfilled original agenda of the four-
teenth amendment would enhance the guarantee's efficacy in accounting
for minority interests.
I. PRELUDE TO THE PRESENT
The history of equal protection doctrine demonstrates the maxim that
the past is merely a prologue to the future. Despite a changed social
context, modem jurisprudence remains largely consistent with the past,
at least with respect to the manner in which relevant priorities are or-
dered. Society has consistently subordinated minority interests to the in-
terests of the dominant culture since the founding of the republic, when
the freedom and citizenship of most blacks persons were sacrificed to
facilitate ratification of the Constitution. 6
A prerequisite for fully appreciating Scott v. Sandford,57 the most con-
demned decision in the history of American jurisprudence, is recognition
that judicial accommodation of dominant priorities at the expense of mi-
nority interests has been an historical constant. Scott, which upheld the
constitutionality of slavery,5" has been described as a" 'derelictfl of con-
stitutional law.' "" So profound is its infamy that, even if it cannot be
purged from the nation's legal heritage, the ruling has become "the most
frequently overturned decision in history."'
Scott, however, is neither a jurisprudential relic nor entirely aberra-
tional. It was inspired by priorities and analytical processes that con-
tinue to influence law making. Chief Justice Taney, referring to original
perceptions of blacks as inferior, held that the Constitution did not afford
them citizenship and basic rights.6 Despite the repudiation of the Scott
56. See W. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-
1812 322-25 (1968).
57. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
58. The Court determined that original intent contemplated and accommodated slav-
ery, see id. at 409, and that the fifth amendment created rights to own property, including
slaves that Congress could not vitiate. See id. at 451-52.
59. Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tulane L. Rev. 979, 989 (1987) (quot-
ing P. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution and the Warren Court 186 (1970)).
60. D. Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 21 n.4 (1973). The attempt to erase
Scott from the jurisprudential landscape has been largely successful, as indicated by eli-
sion of the case from most constitutional law courses. Only one major casebook includes
an edited version of the decision and a discussion of its central meaning. See G. Stone, L.
Seidman, C. Sunstein & M. Tushnet, Constitutional Law 440-43 (1986).
61. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 453-54 (1857).
[Vol. 59
EQUAL PROTECTION
decision by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, its racist spirit
and ideology were evident in the Court's endorsement of official segrega-
tion and investment in the separate but equal doctrine.62 Not until 1954,
in declaring "[s]eparate... inherently unequal,"63 did the Court mean-
ingfully confront the ideology of Scott. Since then, evisceration of the
desegregation mandate" and invalidation of affirmative action initia-
tives65 suggest a jurisprudential ordering of priorities that, even if respon-
sive to different realities, is not entirely dissociated from a discredited
past.
The intense effort to repudiate and disparage Scott is revealing, despite
the decision's fidelity to the original racial ideology of the Constitution's
framers and abiding attitudes.66 Overruling a case requires only a single
decision. The reiterated condemnations of Scott obscure a significant
continuity in the Court's racial jurisprudence before and after adoption
of the fourteenth amendment, and wrongly suggest that Scott was the
product of exceptional criteria or factors.
Scott's context further indicates its crucial position in an enduring ju-
risprudential pattern. At the time of the decision, racism was rampant in
the antebellum North. Concern that former slaves would migrate to the
free states and compete in the exclusively white employment marketplace
accentuated racist sentiments.67 The abolitionist movement promoted
emancipation but, except for its radical exponents, did not contemplate
comprehensive racial equality in a legal or normative sense.6" Even Lin-
coln, the President responsible for emancipation, never embraced general
racial parity. He observed that
[t]here is an unwillingness on the part of our people, harsh as it may
be, for you free colored people to remain with us .... [E]ven when you
cease to be slaves .... you are yet far removed from being placed on an
equality with the white race.... I cannot alter it if I would. It is a
fact.
69
Given such a moral and ideological backdrop, it is unsurprising that
public school segregation had become rooted in the North even before
62. See infra notes 106-111, 128-134 and accompanying text.
63. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
64. See infra notes 146-151 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 169-206 and accompanying text.
66. As Susan B. Anthony observed, "'Taney's decision, infamous as it is, is but the
reflection of the spirit and practice of the American people, North as well as South."' D.
Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case 430 (1978) (quoting draft of a speech by Susan B.
Anthony (1861)). Nonetheless, it did deviate from original contemplations of a federal
government that would be neutral on slavery. See, eg., W. Wiecek, supra note 2, at 15-16
(discussing post-Revolutionary consensus view that states retained sole power to regulate
or abolish slavery within their territories).
67. See R. Berger, supra note 15, at 12.
68. See D. Fehrenbacher, supra note 66, at 190-92; W. Wiecek, supra note 2, at 167-
69, 217-18.




the Court upheld the constitutionality of slavery.70 In Roberts v. City of
Boston,7 the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a black student
had no right to attend a nearby white public school when a distant black
facility afforded an "equal" albeit segregated education.72 Assignment of
students to distant schools as a means of overcoming segregation would
become a politically explosive issue a century later.73 While inconven-
ience and burden provided grounds for resistance to busing in modem
times, they did not impede accommodation of racial separation in 1850,
even when transportation was inefficient or impracticable.
Although Scott is often described as an idiosyncratic reflection of the
values of southern plantation society,74 its racist premises reflected cul-
tural attitudes unbounded by geography. Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Taney recounted that blacks
had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an infer-
ior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in
social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might
justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. 75
Taney discerned perhaps erroneously from founding documents, but ac-
curately from dominant attitudes and legally imposed disabilities, that a
"barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the one
which they had reduced to slavery."' 76  He further observed that a
"stigma, of the deepest degradation, was fixed upon the whole race' 77
and that the "distinguished men who framed the Declaration ... per-
fectly understood the meaning of the language they used.., and.., that
it would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace
the negro race. "78
Given a charter document that consciously accommodated slavery,79
and a society that pervasively and overtly expressed its racism,8" Taney's
conclusion that the "state of public opinion had undergone no change
when the Constitution was adopted"'" or been significantly transformed
70. See Commission on School Integration, Public School Segregation and Integra-
tion in the North 3-4 (1963); M. Weinberg, Race and Place: A Legal History of the
Neighborhood School 2-5 (1967); see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491 n.6
(1954) (school segregation has long been of national concern).
71. 59 Mass. 198 (1849).
72. See id. at 207-10.
73. For a discussion of the emergence and operation of separate but equal education,
see R. Kluger, Simple Justice, 102-09 (1975); L. Litwack, North of Slavery 113-14 (1961).
74. Critics of Scott labeled the Court "'the citadel of slaveocracy.'" A.T. Mason,
The Supreme Court From Taft To Warren 16 (1968) (quoting historian Von Hoist).
75. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857).
76. Id. at 409.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 410.
79. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
81. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 410 (1857).
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in the intervening years is not surprising. Scott is not the derelict that
retrospective glossings portray. Rather, the decision reflects dominant
values that inspired the Constitution.
Ratification of the fourteenth amendment substantially redistributed
governmental power. Prior to the amendment's adoption, the liberties
and safeguards enumerated in the Bill of Rights constrained the federal
government but not the states.82 As one of the fourteenth amendment's
champions explained, the provision was designed to respond to "that de-
fect, and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the
States."' 83 It thus afforded federal protection from impermissible state
enactments." As debates over the aims and meaning of the provision
proceeded, it became evident that society's general disposition toward
blacks remained racist and the amendment's reach would be correspond-
ingly narrow.85 Although the fourteenth amendment superseded Scott
by recognizing black personhood and citizenship, it did not completely 6
break from the antebellum values of both the North and South.
As initially conceived, the fourteenth amendment neither deviated
from nor challenged dominant morality. Political considerations influ-
enced the conceptualization and drafting of the fourteenth amendment.
Especially significant were concerns that the Civil Rights Act of 1866
would be jeopardized as southern states returned to the Union." Ratifi-
cation of the amendment placed basic elements of black citizenship be-
yond normal politics, and "fix[ed] [them] in the serene sky, in the eternal
firmament of the Constitution, where no storm of passion can shake...
and no cloud can obscure it.",
88
Because the fourteenth amendment was intended to constitutionalize
the 1866 Civil Rights Act,89 analyzing the aims and focus of the statute
82. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 705-06 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 156 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243,
247 (1833).
83. Cong. Globe, supra note 15, at 2459 (statement of Rep. Stevens).
84. See id. at 3148 (statement of Rep. Stevens).
85. The congressional debates over the fourteenth amendment were replete with ref-
erences to white superiority and prejudice. See R. Berger, supra note 15, at 13-15.
86. Scott held that neither slaves nor their descendants qualified as citizens or enjoyed
constitutional rights. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 416-17 (1857).
87. See Cong. Globe, supra note 15, at 2459 (statement of Rep. Stevens); id. at 2462-
63 (statement of Rep. Garfield).
88. Id. at 2462 (statement of Rep. Garfield).
89. Even those who supported a more sweeping provision understood "'that the
amendment was designed to embody or incorporate the Civil Rights Act."'" R. Berger
supra note 15, at 23 (quoting H.J. Graham, Everyman's Constitution: Historical Essays
on the Fourteenth Amendment, the "Conspiracy Theory" and American Constitutional-
ism 291 n.73 (1968)). The modem incarnation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1988).
The original purpose of the fourteenth amendment has been a subject of extensive
scholarly attention and debate. Some scholars argue that it enacted a broad principle of
equality. See, e.g., J. Baer, Equality Under the Constitution: Reclaiming the Fourteenth
Amendment 105 (1983) (arguing that fourteenth amendment is lavish grant of liberty and
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substantially reveals the original understanding of the amendment. The
legislative history and congressional debates disclose an agreement that
the Civil Rights Act would grant blacks civil but not political rights.90
Enactment of the legislation and subsequent ratification of the fourteenth
amendment did not "mean that in all things civil, social, political, all
citizens, without distinction of race or color, shall be equal .... Nor
[was it meant] that all citizens shall sit on the juries, or that their chil-
dren shall attend the same schools." 9' Civil rights were understood to be
simply the absolute rights of individuals, such as" '[t]he right of personal
security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy
property.' "92
The framers intended the fourteenth amendment to prohibit "discrimi-
nation in civil rights or immunities ... on account of race."9" Specifi-
cally, they meant to preclude racial discrimination with respect to
contract and property rights, and guarantee equality in the criminal jus-
tice system.94 Their vision and agenda did not contemplate elimination
of all racial prejudice and discrimination, but sought to ensure that
blacks were not denied basic opportunities for material development and
equal legal standing.
Although the fourteenth amendment afforded blacks the constitutional
status and protection that Scott denied," it left the delineation of black
political rights to the states. The chair of the Joint Committee on Recon-
struction, Senator Fessenden, observed that the fourteenth amendment
equality"); H.J. Graham, supra, at 157-241 (arguing that fourteenth amendment reaches
private actors); Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the
Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 33, 85 (1965) (arguing
that Congress intended fourteenth amendment to protect political rights). Raoul Berger
offers a restrictive understanding and definition. He argues that the amendment was the
product of a narrow vision that did not contemplate granting comprehensive equality to
blacks. See R. Berger, supra note 15, at 18-19. Berger's review of the drafting history,
which includes several references cited in this Article, offers an especially detailed and
comprehensive account of the historical record. From a practical standpoint, his
minimalism offers more potential than expansive concepts as a predicate for actuating the
fourteenth amendment. Grander theories invariably engender resistance and dispute,
which render them academic. Some may interpret the fourteenth amendment in broader
fashion, but all would agree that it at least covers what is described by the minimalist
position. Such common ground affords a more promising basis of accounting for what
are at least the amendment's core concerns.
90. See Cong. Globe, supra note 15, at 1117 (statement of Rep. Wilson). Representa-
tive Wilson construed the concept of civil rights to include rights to "'life, liberty and
property,' " id. at 1295, and to exclude those rights having" 'no relation to the establish-
ment, support or management of government.'" Id. at 1117 (citation omitted). What is
clear from the text and tone of the debates is that the fourteenth amendment was not
meant to constitutionalize a standard of general racial equality.
91. Id. at 1117.
92. Id. at 1118 (quoting 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 599 (1854)).
93. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); see Cong. Globe, supra note 15,
at 474 (statement of Rep. Trumbull).
94. See id. at 474 (statement of Rep. Trumbull).
95. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
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had nothing to do with the right to vote or any other political rights."6
Fessenden perceived, moreover, not "the slightest probability that [black
suffrage] would be adopted by the states," which generally denied blacks
the franchise.9 7 Ratification of the fifteenth amendment in 1870 finally
accounted for black suffrage. 98 The framers' initial reluctance to consti-
tutionalize the right to vote, however, further demonstrates that the four-
teenth amendment was originally concerned only with a narrow ambit of
equality99 and was not designed as a broad anti-discrimination princi-
pie."°° Nor was it intended to eradicate racial distinctions that did notimplicate basic issues of life, liberty, personal security or property.°'0 Ju-
dicial expansions of the provision in a racially nonspecific fashion"m
have exceeded the framers' narrow vision at the same time that their core
racial concerns have been underserved.
The ideology that accommodated slavery in the South, and that gave
rise to race-dependent legal burdens in North and South, inspired the
limited agenda of the fourteenth amendment. Although the amendment
was designed to limit some important substantive effects of prejudice, it
also reflected prevailing racist impulses. 1 3 Three decades later, the
Court expressed the abiding depth and vitality of racism in rejecting the
notion of a color-blind Constitution.'" Upholding racial segregation in
public accommodations and embracing the separate but equal doc-
trine,'0 5 Plessy v. Ferguson 106 denied the sense that officially mandated
separation connoted black inferiority.0 7 Justice Harlan's dissenting plea
for constitutional color-blindness'0 8 further demonstrated the dominance
of racist values and ideology. He maintained that "[t]he white race...
[is] the dominant race in this country.... [and] will continue to be for all
time, if it remains true to its great heritage."" 9 Harlan and the majority
96. See Cong. Globe, supra note 15, at 704 (statement of Sen. Fessenden).
97. kd; see also id. at 358 (statement of Rep. Conkling).
98. The fifteenth amendment provides that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. Constitution, amend. art. XV, § 1.
Congress was also authorized to enforce the amendment "by appropriate legislation." Id.,
amend. XV, § 2.
99. See Cong. Globe supra note 15, at 1117 (statement of Rep. Wilson).
100. For a discussion of the inconsistency of the Court's desegregation jurisprudence
with the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment, see L. Tribe, God Save
This Honorable Court 46-47 (1985).
101. See Cong. Globe, supra note 15, at 1117-18 (statement of Rep. Wilson).
102. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
103. Congressmen debating the fourteenth amendment discussed the "proverbial ha-
tred of" blacks. Cong. Globe, supra note 15, at 257 (statement of Sen. Julian). Senator
Davis observed that: "Itihe white race ... will be the proprietors of the land, and the
blacks its cultivators." Id. at 935 (statement of Sen. Davis).
104. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
105. See id. at 548-52.
106. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
107. See id. at 551-52.
108. See id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
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thus shared the sense that racial distinctions and chauvinism were natu-
ral and valid 1' and differed only over the context in which they were
permissible. "'
Although the Court subsequently adopted the principle of color blind-
ness, '12 the process of ordering priorities and accommodating dominant
interests remains largely unaltered. Even in the rare instances when the
Court has recognized constitutional violations against minorities, its rem-
edies have generally been ineffective and nondisruptive of the established
order. 1 ' 3 Modem equal protection jurisprudence not only accepts the
dominant culture's limitations upon social change, but also provides an
escape from constitutional imperatives." 4 Racial jurisprudence over two
centuries has consistently served dominant ideology and priorities: vali-
dating slavery, formulating the separate but equal doctrine, limiting the
desegregation mandate, and now crafting a principle of color-blindness to
defeat race-conscious remediation. Appreciating the jurisprudential con-
tinuity is essential to understanding the fourteenth amendment's limited
accomplishments and its realistic prospects of accounting for minority
interests.
II. A LEGACY OF FALSE STARTS
The equal protection clause has expanded and consumed itself simulta-
neously. While the Court has used the fourteenth amendment to open up
new constitutional territory far beyond the contemplations of its archi-
tects,11' the original agenda of the amendment has remained compara-
110. The majority stated that "[i]f one race be inferior to the other socially, the Consti-
tution of the United States cannot put them on the same plane." Id. at 552.
111. For the majority, separation of races in public transit was a matter of social equal-
ity. See id. at 550-51. For Harlan, such separation was a question of constitutional
equality. See id. at 561-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
112. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-500 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
113. The difference between de jure and de facto segregation is a matter of degrees, not
of absolutes. For instance, the Court has referred to "quite normal patterns of human
migration" in distinguishing de facto from de jure residential and attendant school dis-
trict segregation. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436 (1976).
Such "patterns" are not truly detached from official action, however, because they have
been facilitated by judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants and the racially conscious
distribution of federal urban development funds and location of schools and public hous-
ing. See Lively, Color-Blindness and Context, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 291, 298
(1989).
114. The Court's motive-based test effectively signals to government actors that dis-
crimination is permissible if they disguise their motives. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 319
(1987).
115. The Court originally expressed doubt that "any action of a [s]tate not directed by
way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, (would]
ever be held to come within the purview of" equal protection. The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873). Contrary to the Court's expectations, equal protection has
evolved to account for discrimination based upon gender, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197-99 (1976), alienage, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971), and
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tively underdeveloped.
The history of equal protection racial jurisprudence can be divided
into four primary phases: a prefatory period, the separate but equal era,
the desegregation interval and the current color-blind phase. Each stage
has been characterized by principles that have precluded achievement of
the amendment's original goals, even as the Court has dramatically ex-
panded the provision's scope beyond the framers' contemplations.
The first installment of equal protection jurisprudence established a
pattern that continued through the period of court-mandated desegrega-
tion in the mid-twentieth century: initial assertiveness, subsequent re-
treat and finally doctrinal negation. The cycle of raised, diminished and
foiled possibilities commenced with Strauder v. West Virginia,"6 which
held that a state law excluding blacks from juries was unconstitu-
tional. 7 The Court observed that the fourteenth amendment precluded
official discrimination "implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the
security of [the] enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy . . . [and
contributing] toward reduc[tion] . . . to the condition of a subject
race. '11 8 It also emphasized the need for special constitutional attention
to the historically disadvantaged condition of blacks.' 9
The Court's solicitude in Strauder vanished a few years later when, in
The Civil Rights Cases,'2° the Court determined that the fourteenth
amendment reached only state action.' 2 ' The Court observed that
[w]hen a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes
the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the
laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in
the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected.1'2
The Court, which in Strauder had suggested official implications of infer-
iority as a constitutional touchstone, 23 determined that the contested
practices were not "badge[s] of slavery or involuntary servitude. ' 124 It
nonmarital children, see Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968). The Court has also
held that a state violates the equal protection clause when it discriminatorily impairs a
fundamental right. See, eg., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (discrimina-
tory impairment of right to interstate travel violative of equal protection clause); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (voting qualification rules that entailed
wealth classification violative of equal protection); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942) (discriminatory application of sterilization penalty violative of equal
protection).
116. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
117. See id. at 310.
118. Id. at 308.
119. See id. at 306.
120. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
121. See id. at 13.
122. Id. at 25.
123. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879).
124. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883).
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noted that "thousands of free colored people" prior to abolition enjoyed
basic rights of life, liberty and property, and "no one... thought" them
compromised by discrimination in public accommodations and the
like. 25 The Court concluded that the fourteenth amendment did not
reach such institutional racism.126 In focusing upon the implications of
inferiority, the Court discounted the significance of "[m]ere discrimina-
tions on account of race or color,"' 2 7 substantially stunting the amend-
ment's potential for challenging official discrimination. The Civil Rights
Cases thus effectively calibrated fourteenth amendment standards with
cultural norms presuming racial superiority and favoring segregation.
The perspective of the dominant culture explains the conclusion in
Plessy v. Ferguson 128 that racial segregation did not connote black inferi-
ority.129 The rationalization was essential for exempting official segrega-
tion from Strauder's prohibition against discrimination implying
inferiority. 30 Investment in the separate but equal doctrine commenced
a second constitutional era that would persist until 1954.'
The true nature of the separate but equal doctrine became clear a few
years after Plessy. In Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Educa-
tion,1 32 the Court permitted the school board to close a black secondary
school while continuing to operate its white counterpart. 33 The Court
also tolerated enormous funding disparities between black and white
schools.134  "Separate but equal" in practice translated into "separate
and unequal."
125. Id. at 25.
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
129. According to the Court, any connotation of inferiority was not attributable to the
nature of state enforced segregation; rather, "the colored race cho[se] to put [this] con-
struction upon it." Id. at 551.
130. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880).
131. The separate but equal doctrine reigned effectively for over half of the period
following ratification of the fourteenth amendment, from 1896 to 1954. See, e.g., Gong
Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1927) (Chinese child not denied equal protection by
segregated schooling); McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151,
162-64 (1914) (upholding constitutionality of separate but equal dining accommodation
on trains); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (upholding constitutionality
of segregated railroad cars); see also Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337,
344-45 (1938) (reaffirming separate but equal doctrine while finding denial of black stu-
dent's admission to only state law school unconstitutional); Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60, 81 (1917) (reaffirming separate but equal doctrine while striking down law that
prohibited racially mixed neighborhoods as invasive of property rights). Moreover, even
before it formally adopted the separate but equal principle, the Court spoke approvingly
of "[m]ere discrimination" in public accommodations. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 25 (1883).
132. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
133. See id. at 544-45.
134. For example, South Carolina spent ten times more for white than black public
school students on a per capita basis in 1915. See A. Lewis, supra note 19, at 20. The gap
narrowed toward the end of the separate but equal era as the specter of court-ordered
desegregation began to loom. See id. at 20-21. Even by 1954, however, average per cap-
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More than half a century elapsed before the doctrinal facade began to
crack. Although equality was possible with respect to tangible aspects of
segregated school systems, such as funding, facilities, curricula and activ-
ities, the Court eventually determined that elements of segregated educa-
tion "incapable of objective measurement" were also sources of racial
inequality.135 Noting that disparities in educational opportunity and
stigmatization characterized segregated school systems, 3 6 in Brown v.
Board of Education,137 the Court concluded that "[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal."'' 31
The Brown mandate, which was originally limited to public schools,
expanded rapidly into an anti-discrimination principle requiring desegre-
gation of all public venues.' 39 For more than a decade, the judiciary
pressed the decree cautiously but assertively in the South. t4° In the face
of massive resistance, delay and evasion by the states, the Court eventu-
ally insisted upon desegregation plans that "promise[d] realistically to
work now"'' and authorized judicial implementation of desegregation
remedies including busing.'42
For almost two decades, the Court pressed anti-discrimination princi-
ples in diverse contexts. For example, the Court struck down racially
arbitrary applications of the death penalty. 43 The Court also construed
the 1964 Civil Rights Act to shift the burden of proof to employers in job
discrimination cases upon a showing that challenged practices had a dis-
ita expenditures for white students were almost 50% higher than for black students. See
id. at 21.
135. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950). Among the immeasurable intangibles
at the professional or graduate school level were faculty reputation, alumni positions and
influence, institutional prestige and professional opportunities. See id.
136. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
137. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
138. Id. at 495.
139. In the years immediately following Brown, the Court invalidated official segrega-
tion in a variety of public settings. See, eg., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395, 395 (1964)
(affirming without opinion district court order invalidating segregation of public auditori-
ums); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 903 (1956) (affirming without opinion district
court order invalidating segregation of public buses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877, 877 (1955) (affirming without opinion appeals court order invalidating segrega-
tion of public beaches); see also Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assoc., 347 U.S. 971,
971 (1954) (vacating lower court order permitting segregation of public auditoriums and
remanding for reconsideration in light of Brown).
140. For a discussion of the Court's insistence upon and the South's resistance to the
desegregation agenda from the mid-1950s to late 1960s, see N. Dorsen, P. Bender, B.
Neuborne & S. Law, Political and Civil Rights in the United States 623-45 (1979).
141. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original).
142. The Court stated that there was "no basis for holding that local school authorities
may not be required to employ bus transportation as one tool of school desegregation."
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971).
143. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255-56 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
The Court later interpreted Furman to mean that the death penalty could not be imposed
pursuant to "sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be in-
flicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188
(1976)
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parate racial impact unjustified by business necessity.'" However, grow-
ing majority resistance to the Court's equal protection jurisprudence,
evidenced prominently in the 1968 election campaign, 145 created pressure
for the limitation and eventual undermining of the desegregation
principle.
As the Court entered the 1970s, it hinted that the outer limits of equal
protection potential had been reached, if not surpassed. The "discrimi-
natory intent" standard, first introduced as a qualification of the Brown
decision,1 46 checked the process of desegregation as it verged upon heav-
ily populated areas of the North and West.147 Consistent with the white
majority's distress over the potential scope of desegregation, 148 the Court
invalidated a desegregation plan in Detroit that would have encompassed
the city's suburbs. 149
After limiting the spatial scope of desegregation remedies, the Court
fixed temporal limitations upon desegregation plans as well. It held that
resegregation of a school district, following implementation of a desegre-
gation decree, was not constitutionally violative absent proof of discrimi-
natory motive.'5 ° With the limiting principles enumerated in the early
144. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (disparate impact a
basis for relief under Title VII if alleged practice in question is not based upon "business
necessity" or if there is no "demonstrable relationship [between] successful performance"
of the job and the practice). The Court significantly eroded the Griggs standard in its
recent holding that plaintiffs must" 'isolat[e] and identify]' "the actual practices respon-
sible for disparities. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989) (quot-
ing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 984 (1987)).
145. Richard Nixon, who won the election, pledged to alter constitutional jurispru-
dence by appointing justices committed to principles of restraint. See L. Kohlmeier, God
Save this Honorable Court 114 (1972); H. Schwartz, The Burger Years xii (1987); see also
B. Schwartz, Swann's Way: The School Busing Case and the Supreme Court 24 (1986)
(discussing Nixon's opposition to court-ordered busing). Nixon won less than a majority
of the votes cast. See T. White, The Making of the President-1968 396 (1969). When
Nixon's electoral support is combined with that of then ardent segregationist George
Wallace, it comprises more than half of the electorate. See id.
146. See, e.g., Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (requiring
evidence of segregative purpose or intent to establish constitutional violation and conse-
quent duty to desegregate schools).
147. Proving discriminatory motive in sections of the country that had not effected
segregation by law was more difficult, for reasons discussed at supra notes 159-160 and
accompanying text. The confounding consequences of motive-based inquiry were not
immediately apparent insofar as the Court, in initially articulating the de jure, de facto
distinction, found that the Denver school board had "practiced deliberate racial segrega-
tion." Keyes, 413 U.S. at 213.
148. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 752-53. In rejecting the lower court finding of intentional discrimina-
tion by the state and refusing to mandate implementation of an interdistrict remedy, see
id. at 746-47, 752-53, Milliken directed operation of the Brown mandate to contexts
where meaningful desegregation was functionally impossible. A constitutional duty, for
instance, existed to eradicate the effects of official segregation in Detroit public schools.
See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977). Because interdistrict remedies had
been foreclosed and the student population was approximately three-quarters black and
one-quarter white, id. at 271 n.3, meaningful desegregation was largely a futile aim.
150. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976).
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1970s, the Court created an escape route for white flight' and assured
predominantly white suburban neighborhoods that they would be insu-
lated from the demands of Brown. Judicially mandated desegregation
thus came to resemble a ritual cleansing performed as a condition for
reversion to the societal norm.
Such imagery seems especially apt following the Court's statement in
Board of Education v. Dowell '52 that school desegregation decrees "are
not intended to operate in perpetuity." '53 The Court distinguished de-
segregation orders from permanent decrees in the antitrust context,
where modification is impermissible if a "continuing danger of unlaw-
ful[ness] ... still exist[s]" 1  and, therefore, the aims of a decree "'have
not been fully achieved.' "55 In the desegregation context, the Court
held that judges must limit their inquiry to a determination of whether
school officials have "complied in good faith with [a] desegregation de-
cree ... and whether the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been elim-
inated to the extent practicable." 56 The return of a district to its prior
segregated structure following dissolution of a desegregation decree, even
if stigmatic consequences remain attributable to past intentional discrimi-
nation,1 57 is not sufficient grounds for retention of judicial supervision.
Such a standard of review accommodates rather than disrupts a society
functionally disposed toward, even if no longer governed by, racial
distinctions.
During the 1970s, equal protection doctrine became captive to the
"discriminatory intent" standard. The Court determined that claims of
disproportionate impact in employment, housing and criminal justice
were constitutionally insignificant because a racially disproportionate im-
pact by itself did not satisfy the purposeful discrimination require-
ment. 5 I Motive-based inquiry is notoriously unfavorable to
constitutional claims because subjective intent is easily concealed. I 9 The
151. See, eg., Milliken, 418 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (black children af-
forded same "separate and inherently unequal education" as in past as result of Court's
refusal to permit multidistrict remedy).
152. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
153. IaM at 637.
154. IM at 636.
155. Id (quoting United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248
(1968)).
156. Id at 638.
157. See id. at 644 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976); see also McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-98 (1987) (racially disproportionate impact not enough in itself
to demonstrate equal protection violation).
159. The Court refused to apply an intent standard in freedom of speech cases for
precisely this reason. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968); see also
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing ap-
plication of motive-based inquiry in establishment clause case); Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 702-03 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing
application of inquiry into legislature's motive in commerce clause case).
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
Court has foresworn such an inquiry when other important constitu-
tional interests are at stake. 160 It thus may be reasonable to conclude
that for equal protection purposes the standard's disutility is its real util-
ity as a judicially conceived limiting device.
Such a possibility is buttressed by the Court's failure to adhere to its
own criteria when results would unsettle official policy. The Court sug-
gested, for instance, that a historical pattern of segregation would count
as evidence that an illegal motive infected a challenged action. 161 It
turned a blind eye, however, to substantial disparities in the operation of
a state death penalty 62 and the legacy of a dual justice system. 163 The
Court's investment in discriminatory purpose criteria has enabled newly
developed suburban communities to repulse constitutional challenges to
zoning rules'M and avoid reconfigurations of school districts in response
to demographic changes. 165 By resorting to motive-based inquiry, the
Court extended to state governments and their subsidiaries the benefit of
any doubt and effectively foreclosed equal protection claims by plaintiffs
unable to identify a smoking gun. The most salient feature of equal pro-
tection doctrine in the post-Brown retrenchment period, therefore, is a
constitutional principle with minimal potential for societal disruption. 166
The current era of equal protection jurisprudence not only confounds
constitutional claims by minorities but facilitates challenges to remedial
160. See, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 384 (first amendment "stakes are sufficiently high
... to eschew guesswork" concerning motivation of legislature).
161. See Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-67.
162. Georgia prosecutors "sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving
black defendants and white victims; 32% of the cases involving white defendants and
white victims; 15% of the cases involving black defendants and black victims; and 19%
of the cases involving white defendants and black victims" during the 1970s. McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987). Georgia courts assessed the death penalty "in 22%
of the cases involving black defendants and white victims; 8% of the cases involving
white defendants and white victims; 1% of the cases involving black defendants and
black victims; and 3% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims." Id. at
286.
163. See id. at 329-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing Georgia's dual system of
criminal justice from colonial period to Court's invalidation of portions of death penalty
"three times over the past 15 years").
164. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 254-55 (1977) (upholding use of zoning ordinance that excluded low-income
housing from suburban community).
165. See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976)
("having once implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern" and achieved unitary
status, no obligation to readjust plan in response to population change unprompted by
discriminatory purpose); see also Lively, The Effectuation and Maintenance of Integrated
Schools: Modern Problems in a Post-Desegregation Society, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 117, 118-19,
123-24 (1987) (suburban development patterns frustrate equal protection goals).
166. The Court reasons that without a discriminatory intent standard for the four-
teenth amendment, "a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licens-
ing statutes" would be endangered. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). The
Court greatly exaggerates this risk, however. A standard that focuses only upon state
actions having racially stigmatizing effects would substantially limit the fourteenth
amendment's purview.
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initiatives. Motive-based inquiry may be unresponsive to the workings of
subtle and unconscious racism, which have largely displaced overt dis-
crimination against minorities, but it affords a powerful methodology to
defeat race-conscious programs. The Court has increasingly evinced a
reluctance to differentiate between remedial and non-remedial racial clas-
sifications. 67 As a result, it has largely eviscerated affirmative action as a
means of accounting for the consequences of racial discrimination. 8
Recent decisions consolidate more than a decade of Supreme Court
debate over the pragmatic utility and constitutionality of affirmative ac-
tion programs. From the outset the Court did not respond enthusiasti-
cally to the concept of race-conscious remediation. In Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,' 69 the Court tolerated limited consider-
ations of race in university admissions programs designed to diversify the
educational process. 7 The Court declined, however, to endorse the no-
tion that "[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race."
17 1
More than a decade ago, the Court, deferring to Congress' power to
effectuate the aims of the fourteenth amendment, 72 approved a set-aside
policy for public works projects.' 73 Since then, however, the Court has
become increasingly hostile to race-conscious remedies. In Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education,174 for instance, the Court refused to permit
a state to use a race-conscious policy to cure the effects of discrimination,
concluding that the remedial purpose was too amorphous." Before Wy-
gant, Justice Stevens had "assume[d] that the wrong committed against
the Negro class is both so serious and so pervasive that it would constitu-
tionally justify an appropriate classwide recovery measured by a sum cer-
tain for every member of the injured class."' 176 After Wygant, the Court
substantially rejected the notion of a link between past discrimination
and present disadvantage and hardened doctrinal justifications for disal-
167. See supra notes 39-44; infra notes 169-84 and accompanying text.
168. Only the Congress appears to retain significant leeway in designing affirmative
action programs. See supra note 44.
169. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
170. See id. at 311-15.
171. Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
172. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490-92 (1980). A comparable policy by a
municipality was invalidated and distinguished on grounds that only Congress has "a
specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment."
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor,
J.).
173. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492.
174. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
175. See id. at 276. Even when a state establishes the predicates necessary for applica-
tion of a race-conscious remedy, the plan may reach no further than the proven effects of
prior discrimination. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 176 n.27 (1987).
Moreover, even when a state agrees to enter into a consent decree to remedy prior dis-
crimination, the terms of such a decree may be open to constitutional challenge by a non-
party. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 759-62 (1989).




The Court grounds its conclusion that remedial race-conscious classifi-
cations are suspect' 78 upon explicit and implied suppositions that such
classifications create limitless preserves for beneficiaries, 179 stigmatize
minorities,180 injure innocent victims181 and foster racially divisive poli-
tics. ' 2 Although largely invalid, the Court's premises conform to a ju-
risprudential legacy consistently attuned to the interests of the majority.
Concern that advantages granted to racial minorities by the government
will be overbroad and endure beyond the point when the legacies of ra-
cial discrimination are overcome is unfounded. Decisionmakers that ul-
timately formulate and implement affirmative action programs are
elected officials who serve with the consent of the governed.18 3 When a
majority of the relevant citizenry is disinclined to persist in self-sacrifice,
it may curtail such programs by appropriate political action. Remedial
schemes also are susceptible to inherent limits of self-sacrifice and com-
peting self-interest, as evidenced by vitiation of a preferential lay-off pol-
icy that was collectively bargained for but challenged when its terms
were actuated. 184
The Court has also exaggerated the risk of racial stigmatization sup-
posedly prompted by remedial policies. Affirmative action programs do
not label minorities as incompetent or unable to succeed without special
help. Rather, those stereotypes reflect of misperceptions deeply rooted in
the society's history. Successful operation of affirmative action programs
should actually overcome more stigma than they cause, as white males
would no longer be perceived as having achieved success against limited
competition. Experience also confirms that affirmative action may help
overcome racial stereotyping and stigmatization.'85 As institutions be-
come culturally diversified, the majority tends to accept the presence of
minorities and traditional perceptions dissipate. Even if affirmative ac-
tion does not erase stereotypes, it does not cause them, and is a means of
achieving the constitutional aim of equal economic opportunity.
The Court's concern for the innocent victims of affirmative action-
177. "While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and public discrim-
ination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs,
this observation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota in the awarding of
public contracts." City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989).
178. Id. at 493-95.
179. See id. at 498.
180. See id. at 493-94.
181. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986).
182. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989).
183. But see id. at 499 (arguing that racial preferences based on statistical generaliza-
tions may result from exercise of local political power by national minority).
184. The dispute in Wygant arose from a challenge to the implementation of a prefer-
ential lay-off provision that was part of a collective bargaining agreement. See Wygant,
476 U.S. at 270-72.
185. See Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust. A Comment on the Affirmative Action De-
bate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1331 (1986).
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those who do not receive jobs or promotions because programs grant
advantages to minorities-manifests an especially visible link between
contemporary equal protection jurisprudence and a history of judicial ac-
commodation to the interests of the dominant culture. Individual inno-
cence is illusory when majority group members benefit from advantages
obtained and accumulated at the expense of minorities. 86
Finally, the Court's concern with the risks of racial polarization is
both belated and selective. Racial classifications played a central role in
determining the distribution of civil and political rights when the repub-
lic was founded,' 8 7 and were subsequently instrumental in minimizing
the influence of blacks in the political process. 8 Race continues to be a
significant determinant of voting patterns.8 9 Concern that government
actions intended to vindicate the interests of minorities will fuel racially
divisive politics attaches unique significance to an enduring and common
reality. In a society still inclined toward race-dependent classifica-
tions,19 the selective reference to racial politics seems more a function of
convenience than principle.
Successful challenges to race-conscious remediation reveal the endur-
ing propensity of legalistic reasoning to preclude constitutional account-
ing for the legacy and reality of racial discrimination. Affirmative action
decisions appear to be an extension of racial jurisprudence that has al-
most invariably accommodated the dominant culture for over two centu-
ries. The Court's animus toward race-conscious remediation is
troublesome, however, for reasons beyond the Court's failure to deviate
from an established juridical norm.
Judicial resistance to affirmative action is strikingly intense, given the
relatively limited reach of most remedial initiatives.19 ' Hostility to af-
firmative action is especially puzzling given the Court's allowance of leg-
186. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 561 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
187. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
188. Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988), to
prohibit schemes that diminished or denied black voting rights, such as literacy tests and
poll taxes. See H.R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 2437, 2437.
189. See Pinderhughes, Legal Strategies for Voting Right" Political Science and the
Law, 28 How. L.J. 515, 531 (1985); see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 54 (1986)
(discussing racial voting patterns); Schrag, By the People" The Political Dynamics of a
Constitutional Convention, 72 Geo. L. Rev. 819, 866-68 (1984) (discussing District of
Columbia racial voting patterns).
190. Even if not formally required, racial separation as a functional reality remains
evident in society's most basic venues. The reality prompted Justice Rehnquist to note
that "[e]ven if the Constitution required it, and it were possible for federal courts to do it,
no equitable decree can fashion an 'Emerald City' where all the races, ethnic groups, and
persons of various income levels live side by side." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Reed, 445
U.S. 935, 938 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). For a discus-
sion of the pervasive segregation that persists in housing, see J. Kushner, Apartheid in
America 1-63 (1980).
191. "What is so remarkable-and ominous-about the affirmative action debate is
that so modest a reform calls forth such powerful resistance." Kennedy, Persuasion and
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islative favoritism outside the racial context.1 92 Concern that racial
preferences may hold the political process hostage to tribal conflict 193
relates to a system of governance that routinely dispenses special advan-
tages to particular groups. The Court itself has upheld veterans' benefits
programs against challenges of overbreadth and intrinsic unfairness like
those that have ensnared affirmative action. 194 Because legislatively con-
ferred group advantage is a norm, the Court's rejection of affirmative
action remedies appears essentially and unnecessarily race-dependent.
For minorities claiming constitutionally significant discrimination, the
Court's equal protection criteria 195 present a challenge analogous to a
demand that Gulliver, while immobilized by innumerable Lilliputian re-
straints, identify exactly what is holding him down. Precluding remedia-
tion of pervasive and accumulative discrimination because the causal link
between discriminatory acts and racially disparate impact is overly con-
jectural seems unreasonable. 96 As the Court has noted when economic
regulation and other constitutional concerns have been jointly impli-
cated, "[flrom the beginning of civilized societies, legislators and judges
have acted on various unprovable assumptions.... [that] underlie much
lawful state regulation."' 197 Even when especially profound constitu-
tional interests have been asserted, the Court has adhered to the principle
that "unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people ...
[are] not a sufficient reason to find [a] statute unconstitutional."'' 98
The Court's concern that remedies designed to address racial discrimi-
nation are founded upon speculation' 99 reveals a commitment to color-
blindness that is actually race-dependent. In limiting the viability of af-
firmative action remedies, some Justices have expressed concern that race
conscious policies foster racial divisiveness200 or aggravate racism.20'
Thus, the Court has fashioned a jurisprudence rooted in formal equality
Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1334
(1986).
192. See, eg., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280-81 (1979) (upholding
state hiring schemes granting preference to veterans against equal protection challenge).
193. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinions).
194. See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 280-81 (acknowledging that preferences favoring
veterans are "awkward," possibly afford "more than a square deal" and may reflect "un-
wise" policy).
195. Race-conscious remediation is permissible only to the extent necessary to redress
specific instances of past discrimination, see J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493, which pre-
sumably must be established by satisfying the confounding discriminatory purpose
requirement.
196. The J.A. Croson Co. Court disagreed, saying that the "sorry history of... dis-
crimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepre-
neurs," but that "this observation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota."
Id. at 499.
197. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973).
198. Id. at 62.
199. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989).
200. See id. at 495 (plurality opinion).
201. See id. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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and projecting symmetry. Lost or disregarded in the analytical process is
the reality that racial inequality and conflict will remain unchallenged so
long as equal protection doctrine accounts for only the most blatant and
indisputable manifestations of racial discrimination.
Even if the implementation of affirmative action programs entails some
of the risks of unfairness the Court has identified, 2 judicial intervention
to invalidate such initiative is unjustified and even hypocritical. Dis-
placement of legislatively inspired or collectively bargained initiatives re-
quires precisely the sort of judicial social-engineering and micro-
management of state affairs that proponents of institutional restraint reg-
ularly condemn." 3
Judicial obstruction of realistic and limited attempts to remedy the
consequences of racial discrimination coexists with the Court's promise
to eliminate the vestiges of official discrimination "root and branch."'"°
Such rhetoric implies a socially transformative goal at odds with the will
of contemporary society. Evisceration of the desegregation mandate,
short of a full accounting for the legacy of discrimination, suggests a
commitment that is less than comprehensive and focused essentially
upon self-evident official differentiations. Invalidation of remedial initia-
tives ensures that the gap between equal protection terms and results will
persist rather than narrow.
In responding to the agenda of the fourteenth amendment, the Court
has offered rhetorical imagery but rarely achieved substantive progress.
The reality is that racially dependent attitudes remain "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition." 0 s A judicial commitment to eradi-
cate discrimination altogether,'" 6 if fully subscribed to, would exceed the
original understanding of the fourteenth amendment and might actually
impair societal confrontation with enduring discriminatory realities. So
long as the culture trades in legal images suggesting a state of moral de-
velopment that does not actually exist, the Court may continue to em-
202. See supra notes 179-182 and accompanying text.
203. The Court's objection to affirmative action is partially attributable to the justices'
skepticism concerning the fairness and workability of race conscious remedies. See supra
notes 178-182 and accompanying text. For an exposition of the view that the judiciary
should not compete on matters of policy, see R. Bork, supra note 54, at 81-82.
204. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (charging school
board with duty to eliminate discrimination entirely).
205. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). The Court examines social traditions to determine
whether an asserted interest, although unmentioned by the Constitution, rises to the level
of a fundamental right or liberty. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (after
historical inquiry, recognizing right to privacy encompassing right to abortion) with Bo%-
ers, 478 U.S. at 192-94 (following historical inquiry, rejecting right to consensual homo-
sexual sexual relations).
206. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 188 (1989). Patterson rec-
ognized that "discrimination based on the color of one's skin is a profound wrong of
tragic dimension." Id
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ploy restrictive standards of review to frustrate genuine progress. As a
result, incentive for moral progress will be diminished, if not defeated.
Contemporary equal protection doctrine frustrates proof of discrimi-
nation against minorities and precludes remedial initiatives on their be-
half. Like their antecedents, modem fourteenth amendment criteria
account primarily for the interests of the dominant culture. Constitu-
tional standards that fail to address modem forms of discrimination
against minorities, but are lethal to affirmative action, disclose continuity
attributable to cultural premises that throughout their evolution have ac-
commodated the majority's race-related or implicating priorities.
III. MORAL REALITY AND DOCTRINAL POSSIBILITY
Even evaluated by the limited expectations of its framers,20 7 who un-
derstood that the fourteenth amendment would accommodate "mere dis-
criminations,"208 the equal protection clause has yet to fulfill its purpose.
Minorities have substantially secured rights to travel without inordinate
constraint, 209 to own, possess and convey property210 and to make and
enforce contracts.211 The Court, however, has accepted "[a]pparent dis-
parities in sentencing [as] an inevitable part of our criminal justice sys-
tem"'212 even when the discrepancies are pronounced.21 3 The Court has
also limited the reach of a civil rights statute precluding racial discrimi-
nation in employment contracting so that it does not reach post-forma-
tion harassment in the employment context.2 14 The equal protection
guarantee's failure is even more profound when measured against read-
ings more ambitious than the limited agenda of the framers. During the
1980s, the Court found only three instances in which states denied mi-
207. The fourteenth amendment's architects merely contemplated that the provision
would guarantee equality of contract and property rights and unitary standards for indi-
vidual security and punishment. See supra notes 89-96, 101 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 100-101, 125-127 and accompanying text.
209. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a)-2000a(b) (1988), precludes
discrimination in public accommodations and facilities that affect interstate commerce.
See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (sustaining federal prohibi-
tion of discrimination by restaurants that adversely affects interstate commerce); Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (sustaining federal prohibition
of discrimination in public accommodations that are "local incidents" of interstate
commerce).
210. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1948) (finding racially restrictive cove-
nants constitutionally violative).
211. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1989) (42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) precludes racial discrimination with respect to making and enforc-
ing of contracts). Patterson held, however, that section 1981 does not reach racial harass-
ment after formation of an employment contract. See id. at 177. The dissent argued that
the majority failed to recognize that racial harassment during employment "denie[s] the
right to make an employment contract on [an equal] basis." Id. at 215 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
212. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987).
213. For a discussion of racial disparities in the operation of the death penalty, which
the Court nonetheless discounted, see supra note 162 and accompanying text.
214. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177.
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norities equal protection of the laws. In Batson v. Kentucky,2 15 the Court
overturned a prior holding and precluded prosecutorial use of racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges in criminal cases.2 16 In Hunter v.
Underwood,217 the Court invalidated a state criminal law enacted nearly
a century ago for a discriminatory purpose.28 The significance of
Hunter is minimized by the fact that the challenged statute was a relic of
official segregation and, because of its self-evidencing nature, did not
present the now pervasive problem of proving wrongful intent. The deci-
sion also left open the possibility that the challenged law might be consti-
tutional if reenacted pursuant to a racially neutral rationale. 219 Finally, a
state ballot initiative denying local school boards the power to order bus-
ing for desegregation purposes was found to be at odds with equal protec-
tion in Washington v. Seattle School Dist No. 1. 20
The Court's detection of only three minority-burdening equal protec-
tion violations in an entire decade reflects its hesitancy to probe the im-
plications of racial disparities surviving the demise of official
segregation.221 Such reluctance contrasts sharply with its increased at-
tention and hostility toward affirmative action.' As currently con-
215. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
216. See id at 89. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Court had rejected a
challenge to racially motivated use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor. See id. at
221-22. Finding the record insufficient to support the constitutional challenge, the Court
effectively saddled future claimants with the impossible task of showing that the same
prosecutor, over an extended time, struck every prospective black juror "whatever the
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be."
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 285, 583 P.2d 748, 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 908 (1978)
(citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 223); see United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1213-16 (5th
Cir. 1971); United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243, 1246-48 (F-D. La. 1974).
Courts and commentators criticized Swain for demeaning the Constitution insofar as the
Court had recognized a fundamental right and then effectively placed it beyond reach.
See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d. at 287, 583 P.2d at 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10; Winick,
Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Case" An Empirical Study and a
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1982). Unsurprisingly, equal protection
challenges to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges were unsuccessful until the
Court reversed itself in Batson. See, eg., United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240, 246(2d Cir. 1977) (decision to set aside peremptory challenges vacated where defendants
failed to meet "very heavy burden of proof" under Swain standard); Billingsley v. Clay-
ton, 359 F.2d 13, 24 (5th Cir.) (mere showing that blacks not proportionately represented
on civil juries does not rise to level of discrimination), cert denied, 385 U.S. 841 (1966).
Thus, a reality that the Court could no longer ignore may have inspired change.
217. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
218. See id. at 232-33.
219. See id. This prospect is supported by the rule that constitutional remediation is
not required absent proof of official intent. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
220. 458 U.S. 457, 462-63, 487 (1982). The decision's potential was limited, however,
by contemporaneous validation of a state constitutional amendment prohibiting busing
absent dejure segregation. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 531-32, 545
(1982).
221. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 329-33 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
222. The Court invalidated or hindered race-conscious remediation in several instances
during the 1980s. See, eg., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (non-parties enti-
tled to challenge consent decree arising from employment discrimination suit); City of
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figured, equal protection doctrine affords no real avenue for confronting
subtle discriminatory practices that deny equal opportunity and connote
racial inferiority as effectively as overt strategies of the past.223 Contem-
porary equal protection jurisprudence thus fails to articulate the poten-
tial not only of Brown224 but Strauder as well.225
The Court's failure to confront racism's legacy and subtleties is
demonstrated by its retreat from expansive renderings of the anti-dis-
crimination principle226 and resistance to remedy-friendly doctrinal de-
velopment. The Court has expressed hostility toward theories that
would mitigate the harsh requirements and consequences of the discrimi-
natory purpose standard.227 Responding to the Court's observation that
motive-based inquiry is improper when constitutional "stakes are suffi-
ciently high, '  some critics argue that courts should inquire into the
racial significance of challenged state action. 229 A racial significance
standard would consider whether society perceives a challenged action as
racially stigmatizing rather than the result of a racially discriminatory
purpose.230 Proponents argue that such a jurisprudential reorientation
would allow the equal protection clause to reach the subtleties of modem
discrimination.2 31
Equal protection results probably would not vary, however, if stan-
dards are simply reformulated to appear more sensitive to contemporary
racial realities. The notion that updated criteria would improve perform-
ance ignores the central lesson of two centuries of racial jurisprudence.
Despite its recognition of the nation's legacy of racial discrimination,232
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (plurality opinion) (striking
down municipal minority contractor preference program); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986) (invalidating layoff scheme granting minority prefer-
ence); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 578-79 (1984) (invali-
dating court-ordered minority protective layoff scheme). The drift of equal protection
jurisprudence has narrowed the window of opportunity for affirmative action to narrowly
tailored remedies that correct the effect of specifically proven instances of discrimination,
see United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 176 n.27 (1987), or when Congress pursuant
to an appropriate power promotes an important governmental interest. See Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008-09 (1990); supra notes 191-201 and
accompanying text.
223. For a description of the nature and impact of modern racism, see Lawrence, supra
note 114, at 328-44.
224. The Brown mandate was redefined to qualify the aims of equal educational oppor-
tunity. See supra notes 148-158 and accompanying text.
225. The Strauder Court intimated that the fourteenth amendment was concerned
with discrimination "implying inferiority." Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1879); see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 148-161 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., infra note 237 and accompanying text (discussing thirteenth amendment
challenge to traffic barrier between white and black residential neighborhoods).
228. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968).
229. See Lawrence, supra note 114, at 324.
230. See id. at 349-55.
231. See id. at 354-55.
232. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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the Court has almost invariably has refused to impose remedies that
would demand substantial restructuring of the established social or-
der.233 Even the discriminatory purpose test, however, could establish
constitutional violations if facts and circumstances were examined in a
reasonably rigorous and sensitive fashion.'
Results in diverse constitutional contexts where minority concerns are
implicated suggest that the failure of equal protection jurisprudence is
not attributable to mere faults in the Court's analytical methods. In City
of Memphis v. Greene,235 for example, the petitioners argued that a traffic
barrier separating black and white neighborhoods constituted a "badge
or incident of slavery" and thus contravened the thirteenth amend-
ment.236 In its failure to recognize the barrier's manifest racial signifi-
cance,237 the Court's thirteenth amendment review was no more
discerning than it would have been if the petitioners had framed their
case as a fourteenth amendment challenge. Judicial blindness to the cul-
tural meaning of state action in Greene permitted the Court to avoid im-
posing a remedy with a potentially disruptive effect upon the social order.
Modem establishment clause review also demonstrates the Court's in-
ability to discern the cultural significance of challenged state actions. By
finding that nativity scenes," 8 references to God on coinage?" and legis-
lative prayer" do not offend the establishment clause, the Court demon-
strates an insensitivity to non-mainstream religious views, or at least
reveals a disinclination to inquire seriously into the significance of such
images and statements.
In other constitutional settings where sensitivity to cultural diversity is
necessary, the Court has demonstrated an "acute ethnocentric myo-
233. See supra Parts I-I.
234. Cases involving grossly disparate applications of the death penalty and state facili-
tated segregation of city and suburban schools appear on their face to be constitutionally
violative, even under a rigorous discriminatory intent test. Yet the Court explained away
duality in the death penalty context as a mere "discrepancy that appears to correlate with
race .... [and] an inevitable part of our criminal justice system." McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987). Moreover, the Court brushed aside a trial court's findings of
fact in a school segregation case and avoided ordering intermunicipal desegregation. See
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745-47 (1974).
235. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
236. The city, Memphis, Tennessee, had a long and pervasive history of official segre-
gation, as well as traditions connoting racial inferiority. See id. at 137 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The city erected the barrier at the request of those residing in the white
neighborhood. See id. at 135 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
237. See id, at 119.
238. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). Lynch rejected an establish-
ment clause challenge to a municipally subsidized and maintained creche on public prop-
erty. See id at 671, 687. Characterization of the display "as a traditional and essentially
secular element of a holiday celebration demonstrate[d] no acuity for how [it] might be
offensive for those whose religious heritage, if any, is not Christian or the object of gov-
ernment lavishment or attention." Lively, The Establishment Clause: Lost Soul of the
First Amendment, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 681, 691 (1989).
239. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676.
240. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983).
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pia" 24 and "depressing inability to appreciate that in our land of cultural
pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk differently from the
Members of this Court, and who do not share their fragile sensibili-
ties." '24 2 The Court thus defined sexually explicit language as indecent
and offensive,243 despite evidence that such language is accepted and em-
ployed in significant cultural contexts. 2 "
The Court's refusal or inability to demonstrate respect for cultural plu-
ralism outside the equal protection context suggests that fourteenth
amendment results would not change substantially if racial significance,
rather than motive-based inquiry, were the touchstone. The fundamental
barrier to fulfillment of the equal protection agenda is not inapt criteria
but an abiding sense that, at least with respect to race, the guarantee's
impact upon society should be limited.
In order to revitalize the equal protection agenda, it is necessary to
determine the reason for the profound gap between what equal protec-
tion jurisprudence has purportedly accomplished and what it has actu-
ally accomplished. Brown is often cited as evidence of a general
commitment to principles of racial equality.24 Brown and its progeny
offered powerful rhetoric, but they failed to deliver comprehensive social
change. The Court ultimately abandoned its desegregation mandate 46
for the most part, exchanging "separate but equal" for "separate and
unequal."
The Brown Court delayed implementation of the desegregation remedy
in hopes of securing popular acceptance of its decision.247 As desegrega-
tion demands narrowed and weakened, deferral ultimately transformed
into denial of relief.248 Brown emphasized that desegregation was essen-
tial to equal educational opportunity,249 so the Court propounded deseg-
241. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 775 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., id. at 749-51 (equating broadcast satire of words precluded from broad-
cast airwaves by federal regulation to presence of a "pig in the parlor" and thus
regulable).
244. Justice Brennan noted that "[tjhe words ... [found] so unpalatable may be the
stuff of everyday conversations in some, if not many, of the innumerable subcultures that
compose this Nation." Id. at 776 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan quoted aca-
demic research demonstrating that "'[w]ords generally considered obscene like 'bullshit'
and 'fuck' are considered neither obscene nor derogatory in the [black] vernacular except
in particular contextual situations and when used with certain intonations.'" Id. (quot-
ing Bins, Toward an Ethnography of Contemporary African American Oral Poetry, in Lan-
guage and Linguistics Working Papers No. 5 82 (1972)).
245. See supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 29-31, 146-151 and accompanying text.
247. See Lively, supra note 165, at 120-21.
248. See infra notes 250-252 and accompanying text.
249. The Court originally intimated that education was a fundamental right, describ-
ing it as "the most important function of state and local governments.... the very foun-
dation of good citizenship .... succe[ss] in life ... [and] a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). In
mandating desegregation of federal school systems in the District of Columbia, despite
the absence of an explicit equal protection provision in the fifth amendment, the Court
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regation as a means of achieving racial equality and not merely as an end
in itself. In theory, successful implementation of Brown would reduce
racial inequalities in education. Post-Brown jurisprudence, however, has
largely foreclosed that avenue toward equal opportunity. By refusing to
recognize a fundamental right to education,25 holding that wealth classi-
fications are not suspect25" ' and determining that racially disproportion-
ate impact by itself is not constitutionally significant, 2 the Court
effectively undermined the desegregation mandate's potential. In retro-
spect, Brown stands as a preface to a period of doctrinal regression.
The values and interests of the dominant culture have been and remain
so central to equal protection jurisprudence that advocates of change
routinely have noted how majority interests will benefit.253 Invocation of
the equal protection clause to reach classifications unrelated to race'
illustrates that equal protection doctrine can be creative and flexible
when attuned to interests of the dominant culture. Such doctrinal plia-
bility intimates that racial jurisprudence is a function of selective rather
than transcendent principles of qualification.
Evidence suggests that in recent years blacks have increased their in-
fluence upon the political process significantly. The near passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1990,255 which responded to restrictive Supreme
Court constructions of federal civil rights statutes,256 is a recent example
of a group, formerly excluded from the legislative process altogether, ac-
quiring a capacity to build coalitions that translate into political accom-
plishments. Congress failed to override President Bush's veto of the bill
by one vote.2 57 The experience suggests, at least on the federal level, that
a previously excluded minority is no longer entirely disabled by prejudice
and, like any other nondominant group, occasionally may prevail.
Process-sensitive constraints resulting from rigorous judicial scrutiny
reinforced the notion that education was a fundamental right. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
250. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973).
251. See id. at 28-29.
252. See id.
253. For example, advocates argued that desegregation would enhance the image of
the United States as it vied for international favor during the Cold War. See, e.g., Brief
for American Civil Liberties Union et aL as Amicus Curiae at 28-31, Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (noting that unfavorable comparison between United States'
words and deeds injures nation's image); Brief of American Federation of Teachers as
Amicus Curiae at 25-26, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (arguing that
elimination of racial barriers in United States creates "reservoir of good will for us in the
vast world of color").
254. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
255. See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Bills file).
256. The bill would have insulated certain consent decrees incorporating affirmative
action plans from subsequent court challenges, see id. § 6(m), shifted the burden of proof
onto employers after an initial showing that employer actions had a racially disparate
impact, see id. § 4(a), and permitted victims of gender discrimination to receive compen-
satory and punitive damages. See id. at § 8(a).
257. See 136 Cong. Rec. S16,562, S16,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
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made sense when statutes implying black inferiority, perpetuating white
privileges and denying minorities economic and social opportunities were
common. Given the dismantling of laws explicitly designed to deny
black equality and minorities' enhanced ability to express their interests
in the political process,258 suspect classification doctrine is of vestigial
importance. Continuing operation of the concept actually favors accu-
mulated racial advantage, insofar as the Court employs it primarily to
defeat affirmative action. Fourteenth amendment doctrine now imposes
barriers upon legislation designed to account for minority interests. Its
most perverse irony is that rigorous fourteenth amendment scrutiny sup-
ports discrimination claims brought by members of the white
majority.25 9
The Supreme Court developed rigorous equal protection standards in
response to dysfunctional legislative processes. 260 Recently crafted stan-
dards now compromise the representative system's progress in address-
ing the legacy of societal discrimination. When Richmond, Virginia, the
"capital of the Confederacy," sought to remedy its heritage of official
discrimination, the Court employed suspect classification inquiry to in-
validate the city's affirmative action plan.261 Equal protection doctrine,
formulated to protect minority interests, now compounds the failure to
effectuate constitutional promises.
Constitutional law that evolves without a clear textual basis is invaria-
bly susceptible to allegations that the judiciary has usurped legislative
power.262 Legal scholars devote substantial effort to debating the limits
of judicial review. The principle of judicial restraint underlies theories of
strict constructionism 26 and originalism,2 4 as well as the analytic quest
258. Bruce Ackerman has challenged the conventional wisdom that blacks constitute a
discrete and insular minority. See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 713, 722-31 (1985). Ackerman also argues that, insofar as racial groups are truly
discrete and insular, that attribute may increase such minorities' political power by mini-
mizing organizational costs and facilitating effective lobbying. See id. at 726. Ackerman
acknowledges, however, that such advantage may be offset by the damage that prejudice
inflicts. See id. at 731-32.
259. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 505-06 (1989).
260. See infra notes 269-273 and accompanying text.
261. 1.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see id. at 505-06; id. at
561 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
262. See, e.g., R. Bork, supra note 54, at 11 (arguing that "judicial assumption of ulti-
mate legislative power" violates separation and assignment of powers).
263. Strict constructionism is predicated upon the notion that "the Court has no
power to add to or subtract from the procedures set forth by the Founders." In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). The doctrine directs courts to pay
close attention to the words of the constitutional text. Given the inadequacy of a purely
textual approach to construing the many critical open-ended terms of the Constitution, it
is unsurprising that constitutional strict constructionists constitute "a very underpopu-
lated subgroup." G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 529 n.10 (11 th ed. 1985).
264. Originalism requires that courts confronting vague or indeterminate constitu-
tional provisions construe those provisions with reference to the subjective intent of the
framers of the Constitution. See D. Lively, Judicial Review and the Consent of the Gov-
erned: Activist Ways and Popular Ends 56-59 (1990).
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for neutral principles of constitutional construction.265 Such "interpre-
tivist" doctrines compete with the premise that the Constitution cannot
operate without reference to extra-textual values. 266
The debate is especially animated in the equal protection context,
where judicial accounting for minority interests most noticeably con-
fronts the legislative process and dominant preferences. A multiplicity of
competing theories has sought to animate the equal protection guaran-
tee.267 The theoretical debate is, however, academic. Despite elegant
craftsmanship or moral attractiveness, any principle that is perceived as
an affront to the democratic process is unlikely to survive. Unless equal
protection doctrine is clearly grounded in the text and historical purpose
of the fourteenth amendment, any judicial decision that voids a statute
enacted by a democratically elected legislature invites widespread resist-
ance. As recent history demonstrates,268 the typical judicial response to
such outcry is retreat and accommodation that leaves the constitutional
interest unattended.
Decisions based upon political or social science theory risk victimiza-
tion by their own creativity. Process theory has been the foundation for
much racial jurisprudence of the past half-century.269 Its premise is that
265. Neutrality calls upon courts to employ objective interpretive principles that favor
no particular group, even when the interpretation proves subjectively unsatisfying. See
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 7-8 (1971);
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Prin-
ciples, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 805-06 (1983); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Con-
stitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 11-12, 15 (1959). The neutral principles model
suffers from a misplaced assumption that a singular principle links serial decisions and
that factors can invariably be advanced, as in the case of affirmative action, to distinguish
circumstances from the general rule.
266. See, eg., Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 706
(1975) (arguing that extra-textual sources offer best support for results of some constitu-
tional cases); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 784-85 (1983) (arguing that both interpretivist
and neutral principles doctrines are derived from notions of continuity of both history
and meaning that are themselves dependent upon communitarian notions inconsistent
with the doctrines' political premises).
267. Prominent theorists offer various views concerning the proper focus of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence. Paul Brest argues that courts should construe the equal protection
clause as an anti-discrimination principle directed toward race-dependent practices. See
Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term: Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1976). Owen Fiss argues that courts should focus
upon group disadvantage, because proving discrimination is problematic and strains judi-
cial resources. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107,
127, 153-54 (1976). Charles Lawrence III argues that equal protection jurisprudence
should consider the cultural significance of government action to determine whether it is
racially stigmatizing or implies inferiority. See Lawrence, supra note 114, at 355-62.
Bruce Ackerman argues for an equal protection jurisprudence that moves beyond process
defect theory and formulates "a legally cogent set of higher-law principles." Ackerman,
supra note 258, at 744. Chief Justice Rehnquist has argued in favor of limiting the equal
protection clause's scope to instances of racial discrimination. See Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 649-57 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
268. See supra notes 145-237 and accompanying text.
269. The Court's strict scrutiny of racial classifications is rooted in its belief that "prej-
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courts must intervene to vindicate constitutional interests when discrete
and insular minorities have substantially been denied access to the demo-
cratic process. 27" The notions of suspect classification and strict scrutiny
evolved from recognition that minorities systematically had been ex-
cluded from the political process and victimized by discriminatory legis-
lation.27' Review of racial classifications became "'strict' in theory and
fatal in fact, ' 27 2 as official distinctions were consistently felled in the judi-
cial gauntlet. 273 Doctrine responsive to a closed or dysfunctional polit-
ical process, however, is outmoded, inapt, and even cynical when used
against the output of a system finally amenable to minority participation
and influence.274
Current equal protection doctrine actually may be more pernicious
than the discredited jurisprudence of Plessy. Unlike that decision, which
accommodated dominant conventions at the expense of minority inter-
ests, current fourteenth amendment jurisprudence impedes a political
majority, or collective bargaining process, when it attempts to cure its
own past wrongs through remedial legislation. The notion that race pre-
sumptively cannot be a factor in official action275 may represent a desira-
ble ideal, but it frustrates any constitutional remediation of present
inequities. By making race unmentionable, even though its presence and
implications are pervasive, contemporary equal protection doctrine seri-
ously confounds even the most limited aims of the fourteenth amend-
ment.276 Moreover, equal protection jurisprudence not only fails to
vindicate, but actually impairs, minority interests.
Any theory that would compete with established jurisprudence must
udice against discrete and insular minorities... curtail[s] the operation of ... political
processes." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
270. See id.; see also J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 121-25 (1980) (outlining process
theory in voting context).
271. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The concepts of suspect classification
and strict scrutiny first appeared in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(official curtailment of "civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect...
[and] must [be] subject ... to the most rigid scrutiny").
272. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8
(1972).
273. The wartime relocation of persons of Japanese-American descent was upheld in
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). After declaring officially segregated
public schools unconstitutional in 1954, the Court routinely invalidated non-remedial ra-
cial classifications. See, e.g., supra note 139. Justice Black suggested, however, that ra-
cial classifications are permissible when required to maintain "security, discipline, and
good order in prisons and jails." Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1965) (Black, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia has expressed his agreement with Black's position. See City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
274. See supra notes 255-257 and accompanying text.
275. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (equal protection guarantee is race neutral under all but narrowly excepted
circumstances).
276. For a discussion of the agenda of the amendment's framers, see supra notes 83-
103 and accompanying text.
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account for both moral ideals and doctrinal possibilities. Notwithstand-
ing the limited aims of the fourteenth amendment's architects, a return to
the framers' unachieved aims presents the greatest promise for doctrinal
fecundity. The reference point may not support expansive constructions
of the amendment's purview.27 7 An originalist premise, however, would
oblige the judiciary to effect the amendment's incontrovertible goals of
ensuring legal equality and economic opportunity. 278 Reversion to the
original intent of the fourteenth amendment would thus make it dificult
for the judiciary to avoid responding to or accounting for pertinent mi-
nority interests. Deviation or retreat from original intent is undeniably
activist and at odds with the will of the governed.
Staking fourteenth amendment jurisprudence to original intent neces-
sitates discarding dated and unproductive theories and principles in favor
of core fourteenth amendment concerns. Such peripheral issues as dis-
criminatory intent, process dysfunction and the speculative cultural im-
plications of racial classifications would not be reviewed. Instead, the
judiciary would determine whether a law or action comports with the
original understanding of the fourteenth amendment.
The equal protection jurisprudence of original intent would focus on
whether (1) a contested policy or action implicates a central concern of
the fourteenth amendment's framers and (2) a manifest nexus exists be-
tween the policy or action and the original intent of the fourteenth
amendment. Racially conscious statutes directed toward furthering basic
elements of the amendment's historical agenda would be subject to mini-
mal judicial scrutiny. Conversely, when the relationship between the
original agenda of the amendment and challenged state action is attenu-
ated, judicial review would become more rigorous.
The proposed standard would enhance the significance of the equal
protection guarantee without eliciting the usual complaint of anti-demo-
cratic usurpation of power. Fourteenth amendment jurisprudence
grounded in original aspirations would not pose an absolute barrier to all
arguably discriminatory classifications or state action that has a racially
disparate impact. The parade of horribles that the Court sought to avoid
by adopting motive-based inquiry would not ensue. Tax regulation
which routinely makes discriminatory classifications, for example, would
not ordinarily be subject to substantial equal protection challenge under
the proposed standard.279 Similarly, a reduction in public benefits that
disproportionately affects the poor would be subject to minimal four-
277. See supra note 267. For examples of the Court's expansive interpretation of the
amendment, see supra note 32.
278. See supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text.
279. A tax that without adequate justification singled out an interest protected by the
equal protection guarantee, however, would be susceptible to constitutional challenge.
Cf Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983) (invalidating state use tax singling out press, and especially impacting large news-
papers, as violation of first amendment). Although not directly adverting to the equal
protection guarantee, the Court cited authority for the proposition that such regulation
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
teenth amendment scrutiny. Despite their disproportionate impact upon
racial minorities,2"' such governmental actions are minimally related to
the amendment's original aims.28'
Racial disparities, however, would be constitutionally significant when
they implicated the original agenda of the fourteenth amendment. Dis-
proportionality in employment, education and other venues critical to
ensuring equal economic opportunity would deserve special judicial at-
tention. The jurisprudence of original intent, for instance, would recog-
nize a governmental duty to provide equal educational opportunity in
functionally segregated school systems, regardless of the reasons for ra-
cial disparities. Discrepancies in the operational impact of state criminal
justice systems would be scrutinized closely pursuant to the framers' in-
tent to ensure blacks equal status before the law.2" 2 A traffic barrier be-
tween black and white neighborhoods would survive equal protection
283review. Attention to original aims, however, might engender more
sensitive thirteenth amendment analysis.
Initiatives that facilitate equal economic opportunity for racial minori-
ties would be constitutionally permissible if they were adopted in a proce-
durally proper manner.2 84  A jurisprudence of original understanding
would recognize voluntary governmental attempts to integrate the educa-
tional process or workplace as policies legitimately tied to equal protec-
tion aims. Review of affirmative action programs would ensure that
diversification schemes actually facilitated minority opportunities and
were adopted without procedural defect. 285 Attention to the relationship
between state action and original understanding would enable the judici-
ary to identify and invalidate remedial schemes not rooted in the four-
teenth amendment's initial design. Any risk that a locally powerful
minority might use an affirmative action scheme to secure unfair advan-
even if unrelated to suppression of expression would be "presumptively unconstitu-
tional." Id. (citing Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)).
280. Denial of government funds for abortions thus would not likely present an equal
protection claim under the proposed standards. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
469-70 (1977) (statute limiting Medicaid reimbursement to abortions that are "medically
necessary" not violative of equal protection clause); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 326 (1980) (denial of federal funds for certain medically necessary abortions not
violative of due process clause of fifth amendment).
281. Depending on the benefit scheme, however, it at least may be arguable that denial
or reduction merits close review if it impairs equal economic opportunity. The claim
would likely be defeated, however, insofar as the nexus between government action and
original aim was not manifest.
282. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
283. The barrier might be found violative of the thirteenth amendment, however, pur-
suant to a non-motive based inquiry. See supra notes 235-237 and accompanying text.
284. Judicial scrutiny to insure that states enact laws with procedural regularity would
ensure that any affirmative action scheme fairly accounted for the interests of any dissi-
dents. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 318 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
285. See id. at 317-19.
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tages, as suggested by the JA. Croson Company decision,28 6 would be
subject to the proposed standard.
Although a jurisprudence of original intent would presumptively favor
voluntary remedial initiatives, such policies would not be reviewed pur-
suant to a deferential "mere rationality" standard.287 Absent demonstra-
tion that a challenged program promoted a legitimate state interest in
facilitating racial diversity-specifically that it facilitated original four-
teenth amendment aims and was adopted without procedural aberra-
tion-the policy would be defeasible. Rather than inquiring into the
relative political power of black and white political interests, the pro-
posed inquiry would focus upon whether a challenged plan was tied to an
identifiable fourteenth amendment purpose.
Attempts to address the failures of equal protection jurisprudence will
be unsuccessful if based on doctrinal creativity that is at odds with either
society's moral development or the representative process. Any viable
theory should be grounded not on innovation but on original aims afford-
ing an irrefutable constitutional baseline. Absent reorientation of equal
protection analysis toward effectuating the original agenda of the four-
teenth amendment, theories may multiply but actual accomplishments
will remain scarce.
CONCLUSION
Since the fourteenth amendment was ratified, the Court has failed to
address enduringly and effectively the persistent and pervasive reality of
racial discrimination. Although acknowledging that racism is an abiding
reality, the Court appears to be bent on frustrating attempts to reckon
with it directly. Judicial failure to allow remediation of an acknowledged
social ill reflects both institutional and doctrinal deficiencies. A century
ago, the Court halted progress toward even the limited racial equality
contemplated by the fourteenth amendment's architects.288 More than
half of the twentieth century elapsed before the Court and Congress ac-
knowledged that the basic rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment were still being denied." 9 Notwithstanding that historical reality,
the Court has introduced standards suggesting again that the time has
come for those who have been systematically disadvantaged to cease be-
ing "the special favorite of the laws. ' '2 1
286. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989).
287. A rationality standard governs contemporary equal protection review to the ex-
tent that neither a suspect or comparable classification nor fundamental right is impli-
cated. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 27-28, 33-35
(1973). Review pursuant to a rational basis test translates into deference to legislative
judgment. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) ("judiciary may not
sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom" of enactment).
288. See supra notes 120-135 accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 131-138 and accompanying text.




Even if the time has come for every person's rights "to be protected in
the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected,"29' the
fact remains that the Constitution is one of those "ordinary modes." In
its rush toward an all-purpose color-blind standard, the Court has ig-
nored the reality that the original agenda of the fourteenth amendment
has yet to be fufilled.
Brown may be criticized for attempting to impose dramatic social
change upon an unprepared and unwilling majority. Modem doctrine,
however, has similarly failed to adapt its equal protection jurisprudence
to dominant morality. The standard of constitutional color-blindness
wrongly presupposes a society free of pervasive racism and discrimina-
tion. The criterion also imposes a barrier to achievement of the very
nondiscriminatory society that it posits. Undifferentiating color-blind-
ness and motive-referenced criteria actuate modem equal protection in
terms that accommodate the legacy of discrimination against minorities
and defeat legislative initiatives designed to account for that reality. The
original, relatively modest agenda of the fourteenth amendment remains
unfulfilled. A heritage of racial discrimination is unlikely to be overcome
until equal protection is calibrated to respond to the amendment's origi-
nal agenda.
291. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
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